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RECENT LEGISLATION 
CML PROCEDURE-JURISDICTION-RECENT LEGISLATION ASSERTING JURIS-
DICTION OVER NONRESIDENT TORT-FEASORS-A recent Illinois statute provides 
inter alia1 that a nonresident person who commits a tortious act within the 
state submits to the jurisdiction of the state as to any cause of action arising 
out of such act.2 The statute provides that process personally served on 
the defendant outside the state shall have the same force and effect as 
though the summons had been personally served within the state.a Ill. Rev. 
Stat. (1955) c. no, § 17. 
The traditional basis of jurisdiction was physical power over the de-
fendant4 and the concept of state sovereignty rendered a state powerless to 
reach outside its borders and assert jurisdiction over a nonresident.5 How-
ever, in Hess v. Pawloski,6 it was recognized that a state could, without 
violating due process, assert jurisdiction over a nonresident motorist who 
was not served with process within the state and who did not consent7 by 
actually appointing an agent in the state. The Court stressed the dangers 
inherent in the operation of a car and justified the assertion of jurisdiction 
as a necessary and reasonable exercise of the state's power to promote 
l The statute also provides that any person who transacts business within the state 
or contracts to insure any person, property, or risk located within the state is subject to 
the jurisdiction of the state as to causes of action arising out of these acts. Nonresident 
business statutes are common and have been held to be constitutional. Wein v. Crockett, 
113 Utah 301, 195 P. (2d) 222 (1948). Provision is also made for jurisdiction over non-
reside~ts who own, use or possess real estate within the state. Only Pennsylvania has a 
similar statute, Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon 1945) tit. 12, §331, upheld in Dubin v. Philadel-
phia, 34 Pa. D. & C. 61 (1938). Ownership or use of real estate within the state certainly 
provides the necessary minimum contacts to satisfy due process. See note 8 infra and 
adjacent text. 
2 Due process requires that the jurisdiction over the nonresident be linlited to causes 
of action arising out of the designated acts. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 47 S.Ct. 
632 (1927); JUDGMENTS REsTATEMENT §23 (1942). 
3 However, the statute preserves the right to use other methods of service of process 
provided by law, such as service under the Nonresident Motorist Act, ID. Rev. St;at. 
(1955) c. 95½, §23. 
4 See Dodd, "Jurisdiction in Personal Actions," 23 ILL. L. REv. 427 (1929). For a_ 
critical view of the physical power theory, sec Ehrenzweig, "The Transient Rule of Per-
sonal Jurisdiction: The 'Power' Myth and Forum Conveniens," 65 YALE L. J. 289 (1956), 
where it is asserted that the transient rule of jurisdiction is unsupported by authority and 
functionally inadequate. 
5 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 37 S.Ct. 
343 (1917). 
6 274 U.S. 352, 47 S.Ct. 632 (1927). Nonresident motorist statutes have been adopted 
by most states. For a general discussion, see Culp, "Process in Actions Against Nonresi-
dent Motorists,'' 32 M1CH. L. REv. 325 (1934). A Pennsylvania statute also provides for 
jurisdiction over nonresident owners and operations of aircraft flown above the state. 
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1945; Supp. 1954) tit. 2, §1410. 
7 Though the Court spoke of implied consent, subsequent decisions have expressly 
recognized that the consent is wholly fictional and not the basis of the jurisdiction. Martin 
v. Fischbach Trucking Co., (1st Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 53; Olberding v. Illinois Central 
R. Co., 346 U.S. 338, 74 S.Ct. 83 (1953); Plopa v. DuPre, 327 Mich. 660, 42 N.W. (2d) 
777 (1950). 
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safety in the use of its highways. There is no logical reason to limit the 
exercise of police power over nonresidents to motorists or those doing 
business within the state, for certainly the state is equally interested and 
justified in protecting its citizens against all kinds of tortious acts com-
mitted by nonresidents. While slander or misrepresentation are not thought 
to be as inherently dangerous to life and property as the operation of 
a car, they can result in just as much damage and injury. In a relatively 
recent decision on the subject, International Shoe Co. v. Washington,8 the 
Supreme Court held that due process requires only that the defendant 
have enough contacts or ties with the state so that the assertion of juris-
diction over him would not violate the traditional concept of fair play 
and substantial justice. Although it noted the continuous nature of the 
defendant's activities within the state, the Court said that the quality and 
nature of the nonresident's activities determines whether jurisdiction may 
be asserted over claims arising from such acts.9 In light of the nonresident 
motorist cases, the commission of a tortious act would seem to constitute 
the minimum contact required by the rule of the International Shoe case. 
Relying on the doctrine of International Shoe, courts have upheld statutes10 
which provide for jurisdiction over foreign corporations for tortious acts 
committed in the state, although such corporations may not be doing busi-
ness there. These decisions were not based upon the power of the state 
to exclude corporations11 or upon its power to regulate inherently danger-
ous acts, but rather upon general notions of fair play which require that 
nonresidents who receive the benefits and protection afforded all residents 
should be amenable to suit within the state for their tortious acts. There 
is no logical reason why the minimum contacts theory as expressed in these 
decisions should not be extended to include nonresident individuals as 
well as foreign corporations.12 Modern means of transportation and com-
munication have made it common-place to travel, do business, and own 
property in another state. State lines have become impractical as bound-
aries for purposes of jurisdiction since a nonresident can get out of a state 
with relative ease before process is served, thereby escaping, in some cases, 
all liability for an unlawful act. In addition, the state in which the cause 
of action arose is undoubtedly the best qualified to reach a just decision 
since its own laws generally apply and the witnesses necessary to a proper 
s 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154 (1945). The "minimum contacts" theory was reaffirmed 
in Travelers Health Assn. v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 70 S.Ct. 927 (1950). Though the 
language of the International Shoe case is broad enough to apply to nonresident indi-
viduals, only a foreign corporation was involved in the case. 
9 326 U.S. 310 at 319, 66 S.Ct. 154 (1945). 
10 Vt. Stat. (1947) §1562, upheld in Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 
Vt. 569, 80 A. (2d) 664 (1951); Md. Code Ann. (Flack, 1951) art. 23, §88 (d), upheld in 
Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Products Co., 89 F. Supp. 654 (1950). 
11 The "power-to-exclude" theory is not broad enough to provide the basis for juris-
diction in all cases. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 34 S.Ct. 944 
(1914); GOODRICH, CONFLicr OF LAws, 3d ed., §76 (1949). 
12 See 38 COL. L. R.Ev. 1060 at 1076 (1938). 
1028 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 54 
determination of the facts are likely to be found in that state.13 It is clear 
from the cases that these factors of convenience and public policy are 
important in deciding whether jurisdiction may be asserted over the de-
fendant. 
While notions of fair play swing the scales in the direction of the resi-
dent plaintiff, care must also be taken to protect the rights of the non-
resident defendant. In providing for personal service of process upon the 
defendant outside the state, the statute clearly satisfies the due process 
requirement that the defendant be given notice reasonably calculated to 
advise him of the claim brought against him.14 However, adequate pro-
tection against spurious and malicious suits is not provided. The plaintiff 
with an ill-founded claim may wait until the defendant has gone home 
before bringing suit, hoping to get a default judgment. Although the early 
nonresident motorist statutes were upheld despite the absence of specific 
provisions designed to protect the nonresident,15 some of the more recent 
statutes require the plaintiff to deposit as security a bond sufficient to cover 
costs, and others permit the court to include in costs the defendant's travel-
ing expenses.16 To the extent that the nonresident defendant is left un-
protected against this type of spurious claim, the Illinois statute is subject 
to legitimate criticism. In general, though, the statute, in providing that 
tort claims be tried where they arise,17 represents a bold step in the develop-
ment of the concept of jurisdiction which is consistent with due process 
and supported by considerations of justice and convenience. 
A. Duncan Whitaker 
13 See Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Co., note 10 supra. See also Culp, "Process 
in Actions Against Nonresident Motorists," 32 MICH. L. REv. 325 (1934). 
14 Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 48 S.Ct. 259 (1928); Millikin v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 
457, 61 S.Ct. 339 (1940). 
15 Wuchter v. Pizzutti, note 14 supra. 
16 Me. Rev. Stat. (1954) c. 22, §71; Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §256.522. For a 
general discussion, see Culp, "Process in Actions Against Nonresident Motorists," 32 MICH. 
L. REv. 325 (1934). 
17 Such a rule has been suggested. See Joiner, "Let's Have Michigan Torts Decided 
in Michigan Courts," 31 MICH. S. B. J. 5-12 Gan. 1952); Goodrich, "Yielding Place to New: 
Rest Versus Motion in the Conflict of Laws," 50 CoL L. R.Ev. 881 (1950). 
